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Acid Mine Drainage - A Review of
the Barnes & Tucker Case - Is the
Requirement to Treat a "Taking"
Under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment?
INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of the Interior describes the
acid mine drainage problem as one of the most persistent indus-
trial pollution problems in the United States.' The Bureau of
Mines estimates that acid mine drainage affects over 5000 miles
of the nation's streams and rivers.2 Based on 1978-1980 data,
only 77 miles of streams within the Kentucky Eastern Coalfields3
are actually acidic; however, more than 2100 miles of Kentucky
streams and rivers have been affected by acid mine drainage. 4
This Comment discusses the issue of whether perpetual treat-
ment of acid mine drainage is a "taking" of private property
without just compensation under the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendments.5 Specifically, this Comment reviews the decision
in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Barnes & Tucker Com-
' UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, CONTROL OF
ACID MINE DRAINAGE, INFORMATION CIRCULAR 9027, PROCEEDINGS OF A TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER SEMINAR, (1985) [Proceedings].
I d. at 2.
KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION, DIVISION OF ABANDONED LANDS, THE EFFECTS OF MINING ACTIVITIES ON THE WATER
QUALITY OF STREAMS IN THE WESTERN AND EASTERN COALFIELDS OF KENTUCKY, (1981).
See Id. at 484 for a listing of the streams included in Kentucky's Eastern Coalfields.
' UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF MINES, ACID MINE
DRAINAGE: CONTROL AND ABATEMENT RESEARCH, INFORMATION CIRCULAR 8905, 3 [Re-
search]. (The report provides the following data on surrounding states showing the
lengths of waters affected:
Ohio 1075 miles
Tennessee 995 miles).
U.S. CONST. amend. V and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amend-
ment's prohibition against taking private property without just compensation is applied
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association
v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481 (1987).
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pany,6 in which the court required a coal company to indefinitely
treat acid mine drainage from a closed mine. The Comment also
compares the decision in Barnes & Tucker7 with current federal
and state regulatory and judicial authority concerning the "tak-
ings" issue. The increasing number of environmental statutes
and regulations places a significant burden on a landowner's
ability to use his land as he desires, and raises the issue of
whether a governmental unit has taken private property for
public purposes without providing just compensation. As this
Comment reveals, courts are reluctant to find a "taking" has
occurred. Instead, they prefer to find a valid exercise of the
government's police power.'
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Water discharged from mines must be treated to a pH be-
tween 6 and 9 under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 9
passed in 1972. Controlling the pH requires expensive water
treatment and handling facilities' ° - at a cost to industry of
over one million dollars per day in 1979." Most acid mine
drainage does not result from mines in current operation, but
from discharges from unregulated, abandoned mines. Research
indicates that eighty percent of the acid mine drainage comes
from abandoned mines and pits.
Acid mine drainage forms when pyrite in the coal and ov-
erlying strats is exposed to oxygen and water, forming ferrous
irons and sulfuric acid.' 2 The ferrous irons then.oxidize, forming
more acid and a hydrated iron oxide known as "yellow boy."' 3
The acid lowers the pH of the water, limiting the sustenance of
aquatic life in the stream.'
4
6 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Barnes & Tucker Company, 371 A.2d 461
(1977).
7 Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 461.
8 Nichols, LAW oF EMINENT DoMAIN § 6.17 at 6-114 (1989).
9 Federal Water Pollution Control Act. thereinafter cited as FWPCAI, Pub. L.
No. 92-500, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 and Supp. V 1987)).
,0 Research, supra note 4, at 3.
" Proceedings, supra note 1, at 2.
12 Research, supra note 4, at 2.





Normally, pyrite is exposed to air and water during coal
mining and cleaning processes."5 In abandoned mines, ground-
water inundates the mine shafts and exposes the pyrite to water
and oxygen, setting the stage for acid mine water formation. As
the groundwater level rises in the abandoned shafts, water drains
out through natural and manmade openings.
II. REVIEW OF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA V. BARNES
& TUCKER COMPANY
In 1977, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that the
Barnes & Tucker Company must continue to indefinitely operate
a pumping and treatment facility to prevent acid mine drainage
from entering the state's waters.' 6 The court held that the re-
quirement to treat the drainage was a valid exercise of the state's
police powers and therefore not a "taking" under the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendment. 17 That decision ended extensive litiga-
tion between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Barnes
& Tucker Company. The litigation began in 1970 when the
Commonwealth filed suit against the Barnes & Tucker Company
to enjoin the discharge of acid mine drainage into the state's
waters from one of its closed mines. I"
The water drained from Mine No. 15, a mine closed by
Barnes & Tucker in 1969,' 9 when the company could no longer
economically afford to pump and treat the volume of water
necessary to continue operating the mine. 20 After the mine closed,
its openings were sealed, equipment removed and an identifica-
tion map was filed with the Department of Mines and Mineral
Industries. 2' Shortly after abandonment, groundwater inundated
the mine, causing a breakout of acid mine drainage. 21a
The Commonwealth filed suit against Barnes & Tucker to
enjoin the discharge of acid mine water. In a stipulated agree-
's Id.
16 Three decisions were written resolving the Barnes & Tucker Company's require-
ment to treat the acidic water: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Barnes & Tucker
Company, 371 A.2d 461 (Pa. 1977); Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Barnes & Tucker
Company, 319 A.2d 871 (Pa. 1974); and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Barnes &
Tucker Company, 303 A.2d 544 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 467-468.
" Barnes & Tucker, 303 A.2d at 545.
19 Id. at 551.
2 Id. at 547.
11 Id. at 551-52.
21. Id.
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ment, Barnes & Tucker agreed to build a pumping and treatment
facility and operate it for a period of at least 30 days. After
operating the facility for three months, Barnes & Tucker turned
the facility over to the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth
promptly sued to compel Barnes & Tucker to continue operating
the facility until the drainage met the pH limitations. 22 The
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania 23 ruled that Barnes &
Tucker was not responsible for the abatement of the acid mine
drainage under either common law or statutory public nuisance
doctrines, nor under the state's clean water act.24
The Commonwealth appealed the court's decision to the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which reversed the lower court's
decision. 25 The Supreme Court held that a cause of action existed
under both the statutory and common law doctrines of public
nuisance. Accordingly, the court held Barnes & Tucker respon-
sible for the nuisance abatement. 26 Further, the 1970 amend-
ments to the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act 27 applied since the
abatement of the nuisance constituted a prospective action.
2
1
Regarding the "taking" issue, the court stated the general
principle that the power to abate a nuisance "is an adjunct of
the inherent police power of the Commonwealth, ' 29 and agreed
with the policy provided by the United States Supreme Court in
Lawton v. Steele3" on the use of police power: "[t]o justify the
state in . . . interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear - First, that the interests of the public ... require
such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals."'"
The court found a public interest in abating the nuisance
and concluded that the only reasonable means to abate the
nuisance was to require Barnes & Tucker to treat the acid mine
" Id. at 554.
21 The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania is the lowest appeals court in the
Commonwealth's judicial system.
Id. at 572.
' Barnes & Tucker, 319 A.2d at 871.
Id. at 880.
2 27 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-760.2 (Purdon 1977 and Supp. 1989).
Barnes & Tucker, 319 A.2d at 880.
19 Id. at 885.
- 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
3 Barnes & Tucker, 319 A.2d at 885.
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drainage.3 2 Not addressing the "unduly oppressive" issue raised
in Lawton33 the court remanded the question to the lower court.1
4
On remand, the Commonwealth Court ordered Barnes &
Tucker to abate the nuisance by operating the pumping and
treatment facility, finding that such operation was not oppressive
considering the nature of the nuisance." Barnes & Tucker ap-
pealed this decision to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth
3 6
arguing that the requirement to pump and treat 7.5 million
gallons of acid mine drainage per day was a "taking" under the
Fourteenth Amendment." The Company supported its argument
with evidence showing that 6 million gallons of the water being
treated was attributed to fugitive mine water3" from mines not
owned by Barnes & Tucker.39 Citing the policy power as the
inherent power of the state to "enact and enforce laws for the
promotion of the general welfare," 4 the court held that the
source of the acid mine drainage was irrelevant; the source of
the discharge of the drainage constituted the nuisance to be
abated.4 1 Since the conduct of Barnes & Tucker in its mining
operations created the nuisance (source of discharge), Barnes &
Tucker should be held responsible for the abatement of the
nuisance.
4 2
The court summarized its ruling by stating that Pennsylvan-
ia's restrictions or obligations do not constitute a taking when
they are imposed on the use or ownership of property to protect
the public health, safety or morals from damages threatened
3.4
The court failed, however to determine if such restrictions or
obligations were unduly oppressive, 44 as required in the policy
32 Id. at 885.
3 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
'" Barnes & Tucker, 319 A.2d at 886.
" Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 462.
The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeals in the Pennsylvania judicial
system.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 464.
3' Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 465, n.8. Fugitive mine drainage is defined as
"mine water entering a particular mine by gravity or pressure and adjoining subsurface
mines." Id.
19 Id. at 465.
Q Id.
41 Id. at 466.
42 Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 467.
41 Id. at 467-468.
" Rogers, Acid Coal Mine Drainage-The Perpetual Treatment Problem, I E.
MIN. L. FOUND. 6-1 (1980).
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established by the United States Supreme Court in Lawton v.
Steele, 45 on the use of police power.
III. THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Suits to abate water pollution resulting from acid mine drain-
age may arise from both statutory and common law remedies.4
Under both common law doctrines of nuisance 4 7 one may bring
an action for injunctive and damage relief.48 Other common law
doctrines that create a possible cause of action include negligence, 49
45 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
'+ See West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Rudd, 328 S.W.2d 156 (Ky. 1959) (common
law action for injunction); Chapman v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 327 S.W.2d 397 (Ky.
1959) (denied a cause of action for trespass & injunction); W.G. Duncan Coal Co. v.
Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720 (Ky. 1953) (established a statutory-based common law action for
prescriptive use).
11 BARRON'S LAW DICTIONARY 319 (2nd ed. 1984) defines nuisance as the "defen-
dant's interference with plaintiff's interests." PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971)
defines nuisance as "anything which annoys or disturbs the free use of one's property,
or which renders its ordinary use or physical occupation uncomfortable. It extends to
everything that endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates the laws of
decency or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of property."
Kentucky courts have rarely addressed the issue of acid mine drainage. In W.G.
Duncan Coal Co. v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 720, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, then
Kentucky's highest court, held that the use of a stream for drainage from mines for the
statutory period of 15 years permitted the coal mine operator to acquire a prescriptive
right to continue the private nuisance, as long as the same conditions and circumstances
prevailed. Id. However, a party may not use that defense in a public nuisance abatement
suit since the extent or scope of the injurious effect was greater in a public nuisance
because the public at large was affected while a private nuisance affected an individual
or a limited number of individuals only.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in Chapman v. Beaver Dam Coal Co., 327 S.W.2d
397, found that the plaintiff had to prove actual damage to his property before the
court would hold the defendant liable for the acid mine drainage. The court noted that
water polluted with acid mine drainage could injure land being used for agricultural
purposes, but the court refused to determine when the productivity of the land would
decrease. Id. at 400.
48 Where the plaintiff proved actual damage to the land, the coal companies were
held liable for the damage. In Western Kentucky Coal Co. v. Rudd, 328 S.W.2d 156,
the court held that the damage resulted from the method of mine operation, not the
mine itself, and constituted a private nuisance. Id. at 160. In dicta, the court recognized
that any statute requiring water to be drained as directly as possible into an adjacent
stream for mining purposes did not give the operator permission to pollute the stream
with acid mine drainage. The court affirmed an order for a permanent injunction
preventing the mine operators from allowing acid mine drainage to enter the stream. Id.
49 Negligence occurs when the plaintiff is injured by defendant's breach of duty.
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281-282 (1965).
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riparian water rights,50 and trespass.' Some state 2 and federal
statutes may afford relief in civil suits. 3
Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
54
the Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement"
has promulgated rules56 providing for the termination of regu-
latory jurisdiction upon the final release of the performance
bond" for a completed surface coal mining and reclamation
operation. 8 In operations requiring no bond, regulatory juris-
diction is terminated when all reclamation has been successfully
10 The lower riparian landowner has the right to the uninterrupted flow of the
same purity, rate and flow as the upper riparian landowner enjoys. See 54 AM. JUR. 2D
Mines and Minerals §§ 206-209.
" See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 161 (1965).
52 The Kentucky General Assembly, under its police power, has enacted several
statutes that prevent the drainage of acid mine water into the streams of the Common-
wealth. In the Surface Coal Mining Statutes, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 350 (Baldwin 1983
and Supp. 1988) [KRS], the state enacted several bans against water pollution resulting
from acid mine drainage. See KRS § 350.421 (Protection of water resources); KRS §
350.590 (Power to administer provisions of abandoned mine lands program); KRS §
350.090 (Methods of operation, grading, backfilling and reclamation plans); KRS §
350.085 (Denial of permits and operations and deletion of land areas).
Kentucky's statutory scheme contains machinations to provide protection to the
waters of the Commonwealth from acid mine drainage. See generally KRS § 350 and
KRS § 224. The statute also protects the right of a private citizen to bring suit to enforce
or protect his interest in water resources affected by a surface coal mining operation.
See KRS § 350.421.
51 30 C.F.R. § 520(a)(1)(e) and (f). 30 C.F.R. § 520(a)(1) allows a person to bring
a civil action to compel compliance with the regulations. 30 C.F.R. § 520(e) preserves
the common law and statutory remedies while 30 C.F.R. § 502(f) establishes a right to
damages. Other federal statutes that may provide a cause of action for the abatement
of the acid mine drainage include: Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (Supp. V. 1981); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 and Supp. V
1981); and FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. §9 1251-1376 (1976 and Supp. V 1981). See also
Dallmeyer, A New Legislative Approach to Acid Mine Drainage, 17 GA. L. REV. 969
(1983).
30 U.S.C. 9H 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980) [SMCRA].
I d. at 161. The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE)
is a part of the Department of the Interior, having regulatory authority and responsibility
for inspections of coal mines.
56 53 Fed. Reg. 44, 356 (1988) (effective December 2, 1988 to be codified at 30
C.F.R. § 700).
7 A performance bond is required to be posted by the coal mine operator for a
period of five to ten years after the first year of vegetation reclamation.
11 Under the permanent program, the bond was released at the end of the five to
ten year period if, when inspected by the OSMRE or appropriate state agency, all
reclamation activities had been complete and the site met with agency approval. A
performance bond was not required to be posted under the initial program or for any
coal exploration activities.
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completed. In applying the regulations to post-closure drainage
situations that could continue in perpetuity, the Office of Surface
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement provides these guidelines:
This rule does not affect the standard required for full bond
release which requires full compliance with the applicable per-
formance standards. In order for a release to be appropriate
under such circumstances, it should include assurances which
are provided through a contract or other mechanism enforce-
able under other provisions of law to provide, for example,
long term treatment of an alternative water supply or acid
drainage. When such assurances are provided, the failure of
such maintenance following bond release is not sufficient rea-
son to reassert regulatory jurisdiction under the regulatory
program. If, subsequent to bond release, a problem occurs
related to inadequate maintenance, the contract or agreement
would be enforceable through other provisions of law. Should
such contract or agreement prove unenforceable, then the bond
release would have been based on misrepresentation and juris-
diction should be reasserted. 9
The statutory program in place would cover any drainage
prior to the 1977 enactment of SMCRA by either the abandoned
mines program6° or litigation brought during the period to re-
quire treatment of the drainage. 61 After 1977, up to bond release,
the jurisdictional authority of the Office of Surface Mining
Reclamation and Enforcement and the State Department of Mines
could enforce treatment of acid mine drainage. 62 Any mine drain-
ing acid water prior to bond release would have adequate pro-
tective measures in its plans to insure protection of the waters
from acid mine drainage.63 However, any mine drainage occur-
ring after release of the performance bond must be addressed
19 53 Fed. Reg. 44,356 (1988), commentary at 44,362.
- KRS § 350.590.
61 The Barnes & Tucker case is a good example of a state claiming both common
law and statutory causes of action against a coal company in its attempts to have a
nuisance abated.
612 53 Fed. Reg. 44,356 (1988), commentary at 44,357. (Jurisdictional authority is
not terminated until a written determination has been made that all requirements of the
regulatory program have been successfully completed and the permanent bond has been
released. (The bond is not released until after the five to ten year period of extended
liability has expired)).
63 53 Fed. Reg. 44,356 (1988), commentary at 44,359. (Inspections are made during
the period of reclamation). 30 C.F.R. § 540.11 requires regular and frequent inspections.
[VOL. 5:327
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under the civil common law remedies provided by Congress. 64
The Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement
and the Kentucky Department of Mines will not reassert juris-
diction in those situations absent a showing of fraud, collusion
or misrepresentation of a material fact at the time of bond
release.
IV. REVIEW OF POLICE POWER AS A "TAKING"
A. Introduction
Legislation designed to promote the general welfare com-
monly burdens some individuals more than others. The Fifth
Amendment6 guarantees that private property shall not "be
taken for public use without just compensation." 6 The deter-
mination that a particular governmental action constitutes a
taking essentially means that the public at large, rather than a
single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state police
power in the public interest. 67 "The question necessarily requires
a weighing of public and private interests."
'6
The United States Supreme Court in Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City69 stated that "[tjhe question of
what constitutes a 'taking' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment
has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty." 70 In the
opinion, the Court summarized several factors that should be
considered in determining whether the governmental action in
question is a "taking" without just compensation or a legitimate
exercise of the government's inherent police power:
71
1) economic impact of the law on the claimant;
2) extent to which the regulation has interfered with the
30 C.F.R. § 520(a)(1), (e) and (f). See infra note 88.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (The 5th Amendment is a prohibition directed to the
federal government from taking property without just compensation. The 14th Amend-
ment is a similar prohibition against state action of the same nature).
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1970).
67 Id.
Id. at 261.
69 Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
70 Id. at 124.
11 BARRON's LAW DICTIONARY 350 (2nd ed. 1984) defines police power as the
"inherent power of a governmental unit to impose upon private rights those restrictions
that are reasonable related to the promotion and maintenance of the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the public."
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investor's expectations;
3) the "character" of the governmental action;
4) specific uses authorized by the regulation;
5) any degree of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in in-
cluding the protected property; and
6) availability of judicial review.
72
The Supreme Court in Penn CentraP3 stated it did not adopt
the proposition that a "taking" can never occur unless the
governmental unit has assumed physical control over a portion
of the property. The Court did note that whether a particular
act or restriction was a "taking" depended largely upon the
circumstances of the case.
74
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Supreme Court
held state action constituted a "taking" where the statute had
the effect of completely destroying the rights reserved by the
landowner;" the government's destruction of a materialman's
lien in certain property; 76 height restrictions making the property
wholly useless; 77 and governmental actions characterized as ac-
quisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public
functions .
7
In analyzing an allegation of a "taking," the Court in Penn
CentraP9 stated that "taking" jurisprudence does not divide a
single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely de-
stroyed. Instead, the Court must focus on the character of the
action and the nature and extent of the interference with rights
in the parcel as a whole.8 0
When a "taking" has occurred without just compensation,
a citizen may institute a suit against the government to recover
71 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104, 124-28.
73 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
74 Id. at 123-124, n.25.
75 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
76 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 109 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
7 Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
78 See U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
79 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
So Id. at 130. The Supreme Court has adopted the reasonable-beneficial use test as
explained in Nichols, 6 LAW OF EMINENT DoMAiN 6-114 (1983). This test was used by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central upholding the constitutionality of New York
City's Landmark Preservation Law. The restrictions imposed must be substantially
related to the general welfare while still permitting a reasonable beneficial use of the
land. If those requirements are met, there is no "taking."
[VoL. 5:327
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the fair market value of the property at issue s. 8  A "taking"
must be distinguished from the state's exercise of its police
power.
8 2
B. Discussion of Penn Central Factors in Determining a
"Taking"
In determining whether the requirement of perpetual treat-
ment of acid mine drainage is a "taking," this Comment dis-
cusses each of the factors identified by the Supreme Court in
Penn Central3 as applied to the Barnes & Tucker decision8 4 and
recent Supreme Court decisions on point.
1. Economic Impact of the Law on the Claimant
The Barnes & Tucker 5 court never fully reviewed the eco-
nomic impact on the Barnes & Tucker Company of the require-
ment to perpetually treat the acid mine drainage. In deciding
that a state could require a mine operator to indefinitely treat
acid mine drainage from its abandoned mines, the court had to
determine that such a requirement would not be oppressive. Yet,
the court provided no guidance when it held that the requirement
to treat acid mine drainage indefinitely did not unduly burden
the claimant.
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,86 the Court held that the
right to exclude others was an essential property right protected
1, A suit against the government to recover the fair market value of the property
is called an inverse condemnation.
82 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. In Commonwealth of Kentucky
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Stearns Coal and Lumber
Co., 678 S.W.2d 378, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that a valid exercise of
police power that results in expense or loss of property is not a "taking" of property
without just compensation. The Court held that the enforcement of the Wild Rivers Act
prohibiting the planned development of the land did not constitute a "taking." In
making this determination, the Court applied the factors pointed out in Penn Central,
438 U.S. at 104 to the fact situation of Stearns.
83 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
', Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 461.
85 Id. at 468. The court noted that Barnes & Tucker made no effort to show
alternate ways to abate the nuisance or the economic impact the requirement to treat
the acid mine drainage would have on the company. The court concluded that on the
record before it the requirement to abate the nuisance was not unreasonable or unduly
oppressive.
" 467 U.S. 985.
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by the Fifth Amendment.17 The Court was faced with the ques-
tion of whether EPA had "taken" Monsanto's property when
it had provided trade secrets submitted by Monsanto in support
of a pesticide application to others in the industry. The court
held that the right to exclude others with respect to a trade secret
"is central to the very definition of the property interest ....
The economic value of that property right lies in the competitive
advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its
exclusive access to the data, and disclosure or use by others of
the data would destroy that competitive edge." '88
The Court has indicated that the economic impact of the
governmental action on an entity is an important consideration
in "takings" issues but that only those interests involving prop-
erty rights, which have been created by law, compel compensa-
tion for their invasion.8 9 When the United States attempted to
create a public right of access to a body of water made accessible
by Kaiser-Aetna the Court held that the United States' actions
amounted to a "taking." Creation of a public right of access
would have a significant economic impact on Kaiser-Aetna's
plans for the body of water it created since the right to exclude
others made the land surrounding the body of water much more
valuable. 90
2. Extent to Which the Regulations Have Interfered with the
Investor's Expectations
The Barnes & Tucker Company never indicated that it had
planned alternative uses for the property. This gap in the Barnes
& Tucker case9' prevents a determination of the impact the
decision had on the site's future. However, in the "takings"
jurisprudence it seems that the Court is more concerned with
how the regulation or governmental action affects the actual
profit-making activity. The Court found in Keystone Coal As-
sociation v. DeBendictis,92 that there was no showing that a
statute prohibiting coal mining that caused subsidence damage
made it impossible for the petitioners to profitably engage in
7 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
467 U.S. at 985, 1012.
Kaiser-Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178.
90 Id. at 180.
91 Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 461.
92 Keystone Coal Association v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1984).
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their business or that there had been undue interference with
their investment-backed expectations. Since they could continue
to make a profit and only one part of their bundle of property
rights was taken no compensation was required to be paid.93
For regulatory takings, the court applied a test that compared
the value taken from the property with the value remaining in
the property but stated that the critical inquiry in applying the
test was determining how to define the remaining unit of prop-
erty. 94 In Keystone, the Court held that since only 75 percent of
the underground coal could be profitably mined in any event,
the petitioners' reasonable "investment-backed expectations"
could not be materially affected by the additional duty to retain
the small percentage that must be used to support the structures
protected under the statute; therefore no "taking" occurred. 95
Barnes & Tucker made an economic decision to discontinue
mining in Mine No. 15, because it was no longer profitable to
pump the water from the shaft.9 So the investors' reasonable
investment-backed expectations were not affected while mining
operations were in existence. It was only when the mine was no
longer profitable that the problem arose and the requirement to
pump and treat the water became a burden. It then became a
question of whether it was reasonable for an investor to believe
that he had no responsibility to correct nuisances created by his
investments. The timing of the "taking" issue makes it difficult
to compare Barnes & Tucker's situation with other cases in
"takings" jurisprudence since most cases decided by the Su-
preme Court affect the actual profit-making activity, 97 while
Barnes & Tucker98 involves a "takings" issue that occurs after
all profit-making activities have ceased.
Further, a mine operator with an acid mine drainage problem
remains in possession and control of his land. But the land can
only be used to pump and treat the acid mine drainage, depriving
the operator of any other beneficial use of his land. Such dep-
rivation may possibly have a significant impact on an investor's
expectations since the operator probably has plans to sell the
91 Id. at 497.
- Id.
91 Id. at 499.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
9 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104; Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164; Agins, 447 U.S.
at 255; Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1012; Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470.
" Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 461.
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property after mining activities cease. Installation and operation
of pumping and treatment facilities on the land places undue
burden on the operator, forcing him to incur expenses for prop-
erty that is no longer providing a stream of income. Investors
interested in purchasing the land would be wary of buying prop-
erty so burdened. 99
3. Character of the Governmental Action
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has not adopted the
proposition that finding a "taking" requires a physical entry or
possession of the property by the government.'00 In Barnes &
Tucker, 0 1 Pennsylvania did not seek possession of the property
or of the treatment and pumping facility; rather, the state re-
quired Barnes & Tucker Company to abate the nuisance. 0 2 Un-
der the reasonable-beneficial use theory adopted by the Supreme
Court, 0 13 a "taking" does not occur so long as the restrictions
imposed are substantially related to promoting the general wel-
fare and the restrictions permit a reasonable, beneficial use of
the land. 1' 4 The Barnes & Tucker court, 05 in deciding that no
property had been "taken," may have rationalized its decision
by finding the most beneficial and reasonable use in which
Barnes & Tucker could utilize the land would be in operating a
pumping and treatment facility, at least until the nuisance had
been abated. 106
In contrast, the Court held in Kaiser-Aetna'0 7 and in
Monsanto'0 that the governmental action was an invasion of the
See Rogers, Acid Coal Mine Drainage-The Perpetual Treatment Problem, 1 E.
MnI. L. FOUND. 6-24-25 (1980).
'0 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
101 Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 461.
102 Id.
101 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104, 138. See infra note 80 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the reasonable-beneficial test.
IN See generally Note, From Zoning to Landmark Preservation: The Grand Central
Decision Signals a Shift in Land Use Regulations, 25 N.Y. L. REv. 39 (1979).
015 Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 461.
10 See generally Nichols, 2 LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.17 (3d. ed. 1989). Where
regulation restricting the use of wetlands to their natural uses are upheld as legitimate
exercises of the police powers.
01 Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180. A statute regulating the uses that can be made
of property effects a taking if it "denies an owner economically viable use of his
land .. " Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 260.
'I' Monsanto, 467 U.S. 1012.
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property right of exclusion and compensation must therefore be
paid.
4. Specific Use Authorized by the Regulation
Most environmental regulations permit some property use.
"A statute regulating the uses that can be made of property
effects a taking if it 'denies an owner economically viable use
of his land .... 1 ,09
In Penn Central" and Agins v. Tiburon,"' the Supreme
Court indicated that its holdings did not prohibit all uses of the
property at issue." 2 In Barnes & Tucker,"3 the use of the land
was restricted to the installation and operation of a pumping
and treatment facility. Although the opinions mention no at-
tempt by the Barnes & Tucker Company to propose alternative
methods of abating the nuisance, any proposals would probably
have been considered by the state and the court."
4
In Keystone,"5 the Court found that the governmental ac-
tions did not preclude the petitioners from mining coal; the
statute required only that some coal be left to support the surface
and prevent subsidence. Since 25 percent of the coal is normally
left in the ground the statute did not affect the petitioner's
operations to a significant degree." 6
5. The Degree of Arbitrariness and Unreasonableness in
Including the Protected Property
The Barnes & Tucker Company did not allege that the re-
quirement to treat acid mine drainage was arbitrary or unrea-
sonable. The Pennsylvania Clean Streams Act" 7 clearly designated
acid mine drainage as a concern and empowered the state to
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495.
'o Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104.
447 U.S. 255 (1970).
112 In Penn Central, the plaintiff was free to develop other plans that would not
affect the aesthetic view of the building. In Agins, the plaintiff was free to build up to
five houses on the lots.
" Barnes & Tucker, 371 A.2d at 468.
' See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
,S Keystone, 480 U.S. at 470.
16 Id. at 495.
17 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.1-760.2.
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take appropriate action against such polluters.' The statute was
upheld as a valid exercise of the state's police power and would
be per se reasonable.
Congress has placed control of acid mine drainage under
SMCRA, 119 which has as its stated purpose the environmental
protection of the land from the harms of mining.120 Both the
case law and the statutes place the power to protect the environ-
ment in the state's inherent police power. Therefore, a court
must decide each environmental case involving the issue of a
"taking" on the case's particular facts. 12' The facts of each case
will disclose whether there has been an arbitrary or unreasonable
inclusion of the landowner's property in the regulation's grasp.
The state is free to restrict a private individual's use of his
property under its police power in a manner which the owner's
neighbors could not. 2 2 Modern law continues to adhere to the
common law rule stated "Eflor the Commonwealth a man shall
suffer damage." 23 All property rights are subject to the exercise
of the police power and have been since constitutional limitations
were created. 1
24
6. Availability of Judicial Review
In Barnes & Tucker,' 25 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
reviewed the decision of the agency to require perpetual treat-
ment of the acid mine drainage on two occasions. In both
decisions, the Court found the exercise of police power reason-
able. Kentucky also provides judicial review of any final deci-
sions of the NREPC 26 as well as any exercise of eminent domain
or "taking."
27
"I The objective of the Clean Streams Law is to "not only prevent further pollution
of the waters of the Commonwealth, but also to reclaim and restore to a clean unpolluted
condition every stream in Pennsylvania that is presently polluted." Barnes & Tucker,
319 A.2d at 875 (citations omitted).
19 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980).
1 Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Stearns Coal and
Lumber Co., 563 S.W.2d 471, 473.
121 See infra note 74.
Nichols, supra note 106, at § 6.2011].
123 Id.
'2 Id.
'z' 371 A.2d at 461.
' KRS § 350.255.




The "taking" issue, as witnessed by the above discussion, is
a very complex one. In Patten v. North Central Railroad Co., 12a
the Pennsylvania court commented on the complexity of the
issue:
As in man, himself, so in man's title to land there are two
necessary elements, the individual and the social. Private rights
and public rights, individual property and eminent domain are
perfectly consistent elements of one thing, property in land.
Those who are engaged in a contest for damages to land caused
by the construction of public improvements are prone to forget
the social element that is involved in all private titles ...
Individual property is exclusive against individuals, but not as
against society.1
29
Under English common law, 130 when a private owner suffered
necessary damage from a public improvement, but his land was
not actually entered on or taken, it was damnum absue injuria.13'
The Supreme Court and other lower courts follow this doctrine,
holding that where the owner continues to possess and use the
land as before, the governmental action does not result in a true
constitutional "taking", however much the land depreciates in
value. 132
This well-established doctrine may superficially resolve the
Barnes & Tucker' "taking" issue in that Barnes & Tucker
planned to construct the pumping and treatment facility on the
land prior to any abatement order requiring such a facility.
Noting the timing of construction, the Barnes & Tucker court
3 4
may have reasoned that the land was being put to the same use
'' Nichols, supra note 106, at § 6.20[1], n.11.
29 Id.
30 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 251 (5th ed. 1979) defines common law as "all the
statutory and case law background of England and the American colonies before the
American revolution."
"I' Nichols, supra note 106, at § 6.2011]. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 354 (5th ed.
1979) defines damnum absue injuria as "[a] loss which does not give rise to an action
for damages against the person causing it".
2 438 U.S. at 104, 131.
371 A.2d at 461.
J' Barnes & Tucker, 303 A.2d at 544, 550. (On October 17, 1967, Barnes & Tucker
filed an application for a mine drainage permit for Mines No. 15 and 24. Attached to
the application was an engineering report that showed Barnes & Tucker was contem-
plating the construction of a treatment plant.)
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as it was prior to the abatement order. 35 Clearly the trend in
the law upholds regulations restricting a private owner's use of
his property for the protection of the environment as a lawful
exercise of the police power.
136
V. THE EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY ON POLICE POWER
In determining whether a state may proceed with an action
without causing a "taking' ' 3 7 a court should consider the eco-
nomic effect of the requirement on the claimant. At first glance,
bankruptcy emerges as a way for a mine operator to escape
perpetual treatment of acid mine drainage. However, existing
case law indicates that bankruptcy courts favor allowing federal
and state environmental penalties and requirements first prior-
ity. 138
The key issues are whether and to what extent the filing of
a bankruptcy petition may serve to relieve the debtor of his
regulatory, remedial action or penalties payment obligations. 13 9
The filing of a bankruptcy petition, either for liquidation under
Chapter 7140 or for reorganization under Chapter 11,141 vests the
Bankruptcy Court 142 with jurisdiction over the property of the
debtor. While the filing of the petition acts as an automatic stay
of the commencement or continuation of actions or proceedings
against the debtor the statute is expressly not applicable to the
actions or proceedings "by a governmental unit to enforce police
or regulatory power." 1
43
'" 371 A.2d at 461.
' Nichols, supra note 106, at § 6.17. The Kentucky Surface Mining Statutes clarify
that under the abandoned mines lands programs, Kentucky has the power to enter the
land to abate a nuisance. Accordingly, such power is a legitimate exercise of the police
power for the protection of the public health, safety and general welfare and not an act
of condemnation or trespass. As for mines currently operating, the state can take action
under the Surface Mining Statutes or the state water pollution control provisions to
abate any water pollution nuisance.
137 Stever, 1 LAW OF CHEMIcAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE § 5.10[8], 5-
154 (1988).
I38 Id. at 5-153.
.3. 11 U.S.C.A. § 503 (West Supp. 1988).
IQ Id.
14, Stever, supra note 137, at § 5.10[8], 5-154 n.775 (granting bankruptcy courts
exclusive jurisdiction over all case arising under the Bankruptcy Code).
11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (West Supp. 1988).
14 See Stever, supra note 137, at § 5.10[8], § 6.03[2][d][iii], and Collier, 3 BANK-
RUPTCY § 503 (providing a more detailed examination of the relationship between
bankruptcy and environmental regulations).
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A series of Supreme Court cases show a trend in favor of
protection of the environment, regardless of the financial con-
dition of the owners. This trend affirms the proposition stated
earlier that "[f]or the Commonwealth a man must suffer."',
For example, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision reached
in Mid-Atlantic Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection14 that held the trustee's duty to dispose of
any part of the debtor's property burdensome or of inconse-
quential value to the estate inapplicable to property that threat-
ened the public's health and safety and that violated state and
federal laws.'"4 The Supreme Court stated:
The Bankruptcy Court does not have the power to authorize
an abandonment without formulating conditions that will ad-
equately protect the public's health and safety . . . a trustee
may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute
or regulation that is reasonably designed to protect the public
health or safety from identified hazards.
147
Further, that where imminent and identifiable hazards exist, the
priorities of the Bankruptcy Court must be subservient to the
environmental laws designed to protect the public safety.
14
In Ohio v. Kovacs,149 the Supreme Court held that anyone
in possession of the site or property of the debtor, including but
not limited to, the owner, trustee or vendee, must comply with
the environmental laws. 50 Further, the person may not maintain
a nuisance, pollute the waters of the state or refuse to remove
the source of such conditions.' 5 '
CONCLUSION
Surrounding states suffer more water pollution from acid
mine drainage than Kentucky. 5 2 Statutes enacted under the Fed-
See supra note 123.
, Mid-Atlantic Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, 474
U.S. 494 (1986).
1, In re Stephens, 16 C.B.C. 253, 256 (1987).
147 474 U.S. at 505 (footnote omitted).
141 In re Stephens, 16 C.B.C. at 260.
149 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985).
150 Id.
15, Id.
"2 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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eral Water Pollution Control Act' 3 and the SMCRA'54 provide
protection for the nation's streams by giving both governmental
agencies and private citizens the power to abate nuisances.
The Supreme Court dealt with the complexities of determin-
ing whether an action constitutes a "taking" by a set of factors
to be applied to each fact situation."' These factors and the
three-pronged police power test 56 must be used to determine
whether or not the state validly exercised its police power or
exceeded its authority, resulting in a "taking" of property with-
out just compensation.'57
Mine operators seeking the protection of the bankruptcy
courts will rarely find a safe haven. Those operators planning
to abandon their duties under environmental regulations or le-
gitimate governmental actions will usually find that the actions
or proceedings will not be stayed and will, in fact, receive first
priority from the court.
The trend clearly allows any abatement of pollution to be
an exercise of police power. 58 When it comes to the public right
versus the individual right, the courts consistently find that the
private individual must bear the burden of protecting the pub-
lic.5 9 In a situation similar to that in Barnes & Tucker,16° where
the nuisance results from the owner's past mining operations,
courts will probably have little sympathy for complainants who
argue that the requirement to abate the nuisance constitutes a
"taking."
-Linda M. Stowers
.53 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980).
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980).
'" See supra notes 83-127 and accompanying text.
156 371 A.2d at 465 (the test is that the interests of the public generally require
interference, the means proposed are reasonably necessary and the means are not unduly
oppressive upon the defendant).
7 .S. CoNsr. amend. V and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § i.
"' Nichols, supra note 106, at § 6.17.
"' See Agins, 447 U.S. at 255.
60 371 A.2d at 461.
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